In one narrative of the “War on Terror,” President Bush scrapped the protections of the Geneva Conventions — including Common Article 3, which prohibits “cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.” — for prisoners at Guantánamo, and established the prison as an offshore interrogation center to protect the United States from further terrorist attacks. This narrative is distressing enough, as it involves a deliberate attempt to discard domestic and international laws and treaties so that prisoners seized in wartime — mixed up with a handful of terrorist suspects — could be held indefinitely and subjected to torture, but it is not, in fact, the most compelling explanation of the purpose of the detention policies implemented in the “War on Terror.”
As has been clear for many years, since prisoners and former prisoners began speaking about the conditions of their confinement, medical and psychiatric personnel were intimately involved in a regime that involved withholding medical treatment for those who refused to “cooperate” with their interrogators — in other words, by providing false confessions — and the entire interrogation program — the one based on torture and coercion rather than the one favored by the law enforcement agencies, who stuck to non-violent rapport-building techniques — was directed by psychologists from the SERE program (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape) taught in US military schools, which involved using torture techniques to train military personnel to resist interrogation if captured, and which was reverse-engineered for use in the “War on Terror.”
These techniques — and the chilling theory of “learned helplessness” that underpinned it, which was designed to destroy the minds of prisoners so thoroughly that they became utterly dependent on their jailers — were intended to “break” prisoners so that they would confess, but it should also have been obvious that they would most effectively secure false confessions, rather than anything resembling the truth. For some involved in the program, this was not obvious — and this blindness to reality remains a problem that afflicts all those who still argue that the use of torture is a valuable tool — but for others the production of false confessions was very useful indeed.
This can be seen in particular in a false confession extracted from Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, the head of an Afghan training camp, who was rendered to Egypt, where he was tortured until he confessed that Saddam Hussein had met al-Qaeda representatives to discuss the use of chemical and biological weapons. Al-Libi later retracted his false confession — before he was eventually flown back to Libya, where, last May, he died, allegedly by committing suicide in prison — but this was of no concern to Dick Cheney, who used his tortured lies to justify the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
Beyond this specific example of the use of torture to extract false confessions to justify an illegal war, it has also become apparent that the detention program in Guantánamo, and in the “high-value detainee” program in the CIA’s secret prisons, involved human experimentation. This came to light prominently in “Experiments in Torture: Human Subject Research and Evidence of Experimentation in the ‘Enhanced’ Interrogation Program,” a report published by Physicians for Human Rights last June, and another important part of the story emerged in October, when the journalist Jason Leopold and the psychologist and blogger Jeff Kaye (who has spent many years placing the “War on Terror” detention and interrogation policies in the wider context of CIA experimentation since the 1950s) published an article on Truthout entitled, “Wolfowitz Directive Gave Legal Cover to Detainee Experimentation Program,” revealing how the program had been given the green light by Cheney’s deputy in March 2002.
Jason and Jeff have just published another exposé for Truthout, demonstrating how every single prisoner at Guantánamo was forced to “take a high dosage of a controversial antimalarial drug, mefloquine, an act that an Army public health physician called ‘pharmacologic waterboarding.'” The article reveals another chilling aspect of Guantánamo as a laboratory for human experimentation, and also confirms what former prisoners have been stating for many years, although without the detailed evidence unearthed by Kaye and Leopold. In my book The Guantánamo Files, for example, I included the following passages, which will undoubtedly resonate with those who read the cross-posted article that follows:
Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Ruhal Ahmed [three British citizens commonly known as “the Tipton Three”] described an incident in August 2002 when medical staff toured the cell blocks asking the prisoners if they wanted an injection, “although they wouldn’t say what it was for.” They said that most of the prisoners refused, but the medical staff then returned with an ERF team who forced them to have the injections anyway. Ahmed said that the drug made him feel “very drowsy,” and added, “I have no idea why they were giving us these injections. It happened perhaps a dozen times altogether and I believe it still goes on at the camp. You are not allowed to refuse it and you don’t know what it is for.”
Abdullah al-Noaimi [from Bahrain] told his lawyers that within his first few days at Guantánamo he “was injected with an unknown substance which made him depressed and despondent. He was unable to control his thoughts and his mind raced. He was also unable to control his body and fell to the floor.” He was then placed in isolation for three days, where medical staff administered an unknown medicine “that made him feel drunk,’ until he refused to take it any more, and on another occasion was given pills which “caused him to hear voices.” When he told his interrogators that he “felt like he was losing his mind,” their only response was, “Yeah, we know.”
Controversial Drug Given to All Guantánamo Detainees Akin to “Pharmacologic Waterboarding”
By Jason Leopold and Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, December 1, 2010
The Defense Department forced all “war on terror” detainees at the Guantánamo Bay prison to take a high dosage of a controversial antimalarial drug, mefloquine, an act that an Army public health physician called “pharmacologic waterboarding.”
The US military administered the drug despite Pentagon knowledge that mefloquine caused severe neuropsychiatric side effects, including suicidal thoughts, hallucinations and anxiety. The drug was used on the prisoners whether they had malaria or not.
The revelation, which has not been previously reported, was buried in documents publicly released by the Defense Department (DoD) two years ago as part of the government’s investigation into the June 2006 deaths of three Guantánamo detainees.
Army Staff Sgt. Joe Hickman, who was stationed at Guantánamo at the time of the suicides in 2006, and has presented evidence that demonstrates the three detainees could not have died by hanging themselves, noticed in the detainees’ medical files that they were given mefloquine. Hickman has been investigating the circumstances behind the detainees’ deaths for nearly four years.
Interviews with mefloquine and malaria experts and a review of peer-reviewed journals and government documents show there were no preexisting cases where mefloquine was ever prescribed for mass presumptive treatment of malaria.
All detainees arriving at Guantánamo in January 2002 were first given a treatment dosage of 1,250 mg of mefloquine, before laboratory tests were conducted to determine if they actually had the disease, according to a section of the DoD documents entitled “Standard Inprocessing Orders For Detainees.” The 1,250 mg dosage is what would be given if the detainees actually had malaria. That dosage is five times higher than the prophylactic dose given to individuals to prevent the disease.
Maj. Remington Nevin, an Army public health physician, who formerly worked at the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center and has written extensively about mefloquine, said in an interview the use of mefloquine “in this manner … is, at best, an egregious malpractice.”
The government has exposed detainees “to unacceptably high risks of potentially severe neuropsychiatric side effects, including seizures, intense vertigo, hallucinations, paranoid delusions, aggression, panic, anxiety, severe insomnia, and thoughts of suicide,” said Nevin, who was not speaking in an official capacity, but offering opinions as a board-certified, preventive medicine physician. “These side effects could be as severe as those intended through the application of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques.'”
Mefloquine is also known by its brand name Lariam. It was researched by the US Army in the 1970s and licensed by the Food and Drug Administration in 1989. Since its introduction, it has been directly linked to serious adverse effects, including depression, anxiety, panic attacks, confusion, hallucinations, bizarre dreams, nausea, vomiting, sores and homicidal and suicidal thoughts. It belongs to a class of drugs known as quinolines, which were part of a 1956 human experiment study to investigate “toxic cerebral states,” as part of the CIA’s MKULTRA mind-control program.
The Army tapped the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) to develop mefloquine and it was later licensed to the Swiss pharmaceutical company F. Hoffman-La Roche. The first human trials of mefloquine were conducted in the mid-1970s on prisoners, who were deliberately inoculated with malaria at Stateville Correctional prison near Joliet, Illinois, the site of controversial antimalarial experimentation in the early 1940s.
The drug was administered to Guantánamo detainees without regard for their medical or psychological history, despite its considerable risk of exacerbating pre-existing conditions. Mefloquine is also known to have serious side effects among individuals under treatment for depression or other serious mental health disorders, which numerous detainees were said to have been treated for, according to their attorneys and published reports.
In 2002, when the prison was established and mefloquine first administered, there were dozens of suicide attempts at Guantánamo. That same year, the DoD stopped reporting attempted suicides.
By February 2002, there were at least 459 detainees imprisoned at Guantánamo. In March of that year, according to the book, “Saving Grace at Guantánamo Bay: A Memoir of a Citizen Warrior,” by Montgomery Granger, “the situation” at the prison began “deteriorating rapidly.”
“There is more and more psychosis becoming evident in detainees,” wrote Granger, an Army Reserve major and medic who was stationed at Guantánamo in 2002. “We already have probably a dozen or so detainees who are psychiatric cases. The number is growing.”
“Presumptively Treating” Malaria
Though malaria is nonexistent in Cuba, DoD spokeswoman Maj. Tanya Bradsher told Truthout that the US government was concerned that the disease would be reintroduced into the country as detainees were transferred to the prison facility in January 2002.
A “decision was made,” Bradsher said in an email, to “presumptively treat each arriving Guantánamo detainee for malaria to prevent the possibility of having mosquito-borne [malaria] spread from an infected individual to uninfected individuals in the Guantánamo population, the guard force, the population at the Naval base or the broader Cuban population.”
But Granger wrote in his book that a Navy entomologist was present at Guantánamo in January and February 2002 and during that time only identified insects that were nuisances and did not identify any insects that were carriers of a disease, such as malaria.
Nevertheless, Bradsher said the “mefloquine dosage [given to detainees] was entirely for public health purposes … and not for any other purpose” and “is completely appropriate.”
“The risks and benefits to the health of the detainees were central considerations,” she added.
But a September 13, 2002, DoD memo governing the operational use of mefloquine said, “Malaria is not a threat in Guantánamo Bay.” Indeed, there have only been two to three reported cases of malaria at Guantánamo.
The DoD memo, signed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs William Winkenwerder, was sent to then-Rep. John McHugh, the Republican chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Subcommittee on Military Personnel. McHugh is now Secretary of the Army.
A Senate staff member told Truthout the Senate Armed Services Committee was never briefed about malaria concerns at Guantánamo nor was the committee made aware of “any issue related to the use of mefloquine or any other anti-malarial drug” related to “the treatment of detainees.”
When questions were raised at a February 19, 2002 meeting of the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board (AFEB) about what measures the military was taking to address malaria concerns at Guantánamo, Navy Capt. Alan J. Lund did not disclose that mefloquine was being administered to detainees as a form of presumptive treatment.
Yund said the military gave detainees a different anti-malarial drug known as primaquine and noted that “informed consent” was “absolutely practiced” prior to administering drugs to detainees, an assertion that contradicts claims made by numerous prisoners who said they were forced to take drugs even if they protested. Yund did not return calls for comment.
Bradsher declined to respond to a follow-up question about who made the decision to presumptively treat detainees with mefloquine.
An April 16, 2002, meeting of the Interagency Working Group for Antimalarial Chemotherapy, which DoD, along with other federal government agencies, is a part of, was specifically dedicated to investigating mefloquine’s use and the drug’s side effects. The group concluded that study designs on mefloquine up to that point were flawed or biased and criticized DoD medical policy for disregarding scientific fact and basing itself more on “sensational or best marketed information.”
The Working Group called for additional research, and warned, “other treatment regimes should be carefully considered before mefloquine is used at the doses required for treatment.”
Still, despite the red flags that pointed to mefloquine as a high-risk drug, the DoD’s mefloquine program proceeded.
In fact, a June 2004 set of guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) says mefloquine should only be used when other standard drugs were not available, as it “is associated with a higher rate of severe neuropsychiatric reactions when used at treatment doses.”
According to the CDC, “‘presumptive treatment’ without the benefit of laboratory confirmation should be reserved for extreme circumstances (strong clinical suspicion, severe disease, impossibility of obtaining prompt laboratory confirmation).”
A CDC spokesman refused to comment about the “presumptive treatment” of malaria at Guantanamo and referred questions to the DoD.
Nevin said, if “mass presumptive treatment has been given consistently, many dozens of detainees, possibly hundreds, would almost certainly have suffered such disabling adverse events.”
“It appears that for years, senior Defense health leaders have condoned the medically indefensible practice of using high doses of mefloquine ostensibly for mass presumptive treatment of malaria among detainees from the Middle East and Asia lacking any evidence of disease,” Nevin said. “This is a use for which there is no precedent in the medical literature and which is specifically discouraged among refugees by malaria experts at the Centers for Disease Control.”
Even proponents of limited mefloquine usage are seriously questioning the logic behind the DoD’s actions. Professor James McCarthy, chair of the Infectious Diseases Division of the Queensland Institute of Medicine in Australia, who is an advocate of the safe use of mefloquine under proper safeguards, and takes it himself when traveling, told Truthout he was unaware of the use of mefloquine for mass presumptive treatment as described by the DoD, but could imagine it under certain circumstances.
However, when informed that lab tests were available and the detainees were screened for the blood product G6PD, used to determine the suitability of certain antimalarial drugs, McCarthy found the DoD’s use of mefloquine at Guantánamo difficult to understand and “hard to support on pure clinical grounds as an antimalarial.”
Treatment, Torture or an Experiment?
Another striking point about the DoD’s decision to presumptively treat mostly Muslim detainees with mefloquine beginning in 2002 is that it is the exact opposite of how the DoD responded to malaria concerns among the Haitian refugees who were held at Guantánamo a decade earlier.
Between 1991 and 1992, more than 14,000 Haitian refugees were held in temporary camps set up at Guantánamo. A large number of Haitian refugees — 235 during a four-month period — were diagnosed with malaria. But instead of presumptively treating the refugee population at Guantánamo, the DoD conducted laboratory tests first and only the individuals who were found to be malaria carriers were administered chloroquine.
Another example of how the DoD approached malaria treatment differently for other subjects is in the case of Army Rangers who returned from malarial areas of Afghanistan between June and September 2002 and were infected with the disease at an attack rate of 52.4 cases per 1,000 soldiers.
However, the Rangers did not receive mass presumptive treatment of mefloquine. They were given other standard drugs after laboratory tests, according to documents obtained by Truthout.
Nevin said the DoD’s treatment of Haitian refugees represented “a situation that arguably presented a much higher risk of disease and secondary transmission, but one which US medical experts stated at the time could be safely managed through more conservative and focused measures.”
Why did the government use the “conservative and focused” approach in treating Haitian refugees and the Army rangers, but then revert to presumptive mefloquine treatment in the case of the Guantánamo detainees, who — a month after the prison facility opened in January 2002 — were stripped of their protections under the Geneva Conventions?
According to Sean Camoni, a Seton Hall University law school research fellow, “there is no legitimate medical purpose for treating malaria in this way” and the drug’s severe side effects may actually have been the DoD’s intended impact in calling for the drug’s usage.
Camoni and several other Seton Hall law school students have been working on a report about mefloquine use on Guantánamo detainees. Their work was conducted independently of Truthout’s investigation.
A copy of the newly-published Seton Hall report, “Drug Abuse? An Exploration of the Government’s Use of Mefloquine at Guantánamo,” says mefloquine’s extreme side effects may have violated a provision in the antitorture statute related to the use of “mind altering substances or other procedures” that “profoundly disrupts the senses or the personality.”
Legal memos prepared in August 2002 by former DoJ attorneys Jay Bybee and John Yoo for the CIA’s torture program permitted the use of drugs for interrogations. The authority was also contained in a legal memo Yoo prepared for the DoD less than a year later after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld convened a working group to address “policy considerations with respect to the choice of interrogation techniques.”
In September, Truthout reported that the DoD’s inspector general (IG) conducted an investigation into allegations that detainees in custody of the US military were drugged. The IG’s report, which remains classified, was completed a year ago and was shared with the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Kathleen Long, a spokeswoman for the Armed Services Committee, told Truthout at the time that the IG report did not substantiate allegations of drugging of prisoners for the “purposes of interrogation.”
The medical files for detainee 693 [Salah al-Salami, one of the three men who died in June 2006] released in 2008 shows that, two weeks after he first started taking mefloquine in June 2002, he was interviewed by Guantánamo medical personnel and reported he was suffering from nightmares, hallucinations, anxiety auditory and visual hallucinations, anxiety, sleep loss and suicidal thoughts.
The detainee said he had previously been treated for anxiety and had a family history of mental illness. He was diagnosed with adjustment disorder, according to the DoD documents. Guantánamo medical staff who interviewed the detainee did not state that he may have been experiencing mefloquine-related side effects in an evaluation of his condition.
Mark Denbeaux, the director of the Seton Hall Law Center for Policy and Research, who conducted an independent investigation into the 2006 deaths of the three Guantánamo detainees, said in an interview “almost every remaining question here would be solved if the [detainees’] full medical records were released.”
The government has refused to release Guantánamo detainees’ medical records, citing privacy concerns in some cases, and assertions that they are “protected” or “classified” in other instances. The few medical records that have been released have been heavily redacted.
“A crucial issue is dosage” Denbeaux said. “Giving detainees toxic doses of mefloquine has mind-altering consequences that may be permanent. Without access to medical records, which the government refuses to release, the use of mefloquine in this manner appears to be grotesque malpractice at best, if not human experimentation or ‘enhanced interrogation.’ The question is where are the doctors who approved this practice and where are the medical records?”
Bradsher did not respond to questions about whether the government kept data about the adverse effects mefloquine had on detainees.
An absolute prohibition against experiments on prisoners of war is contained in the Geneva Conventions, but President George W. Bush stripped war on terror detainees of those protections. Some of the “enhanced interrogation techniques” also had an experimental quality.
At the same time detainees were given high doses of mefloquine, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz issued a directive changing the rules on human subject protections for DoD experiments, allowing for a waiver of informed consent when necessary for developing a “medical product” for the armed services. Bush also granted unprecedented authority to the secretary of Health and Human Services to classify information as secret.
Briefings on Side Effects
As the DoD was administering mefloquine to Guantánamo prisoners, senior Pentagon officials were being briefed about the drug’s dangerous side effects. During one such briefing, questions arose about what steps the military was taking to address malaria concerns among detainees sent to Guantánamo.
Internal documents from Roche, obtained by UPI in 2002, indicated that the pharmaceutical company had been tracking suicidal reactions to Lariam going back to the early 1990s.
In September 2002, Roche sent a letter to physicians and pharmacists stating that the company changed its warning labels for mefloquine.
Roche further said in one of two new warning paragraphs that some of the symptoms associated with mefloquine use included suicidal thoughts and suicide and also “may cause psychiatric symptoms in a number of patients, ranging from anxiety, paranoia, and depression to hallucination and psychotic behavior,” which “have been reported to continue long after mefloquine has been stopped.”
Cmdr. William Manofsky, who is retired from the US Navy and currently on disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder and side effects from mefloquine, said those are some of the symptoms he initially suffered from after taking the drug for several months beginning in November 2002 after he was deployed to the Middle East to work on two Naval projects.
In March 2003, “I became violently ill during a night live-fire exercise with the [Navy] SEALS,” Manofsky said. “I felt like I was air sick. All the flashing lights from the tracers and rockets … targeting device made me really sick. I threw up for an hour straight before being medevac’d back to the Special Forces compound where I had my first ever panic attack.”
For three years, he had to walk with a cane due to a loss of equilibrium. Numerous other accounts like Manofsky’s can be found on the web site lariaminfo.org.
In 2008, Dr. Nevin published a study detailing a high prevalence of mental health contraindications to the safe use of mefloquine in soldiers deployed to Afghanistan. Responding in part to concerns raised by the mefloquine-associated suicide of Army Spc. Juan Torres, internal Army presentations confirmed that the drug had been widely misprescribed to soldiers with contraindications, including to many on antidepressants.
A formal policy memo in February 2009 from Army Surgeon General Eric Schoomaker removed mefloquine as a “first-line” agent, and changed the policy so that mefloquine would not be prescribed to Army personnel unless they had contraindications to the preferred drug, the antibiotic doxycycline. Nor could mefloquine be prescribed to any personnel with a history of traumatic brain injury or mental illness.
By September 2009, the policy was extended throughout the DoD.
New prisoners are no longer arriving at Guantánamo and the prison population has been in decline in recent years as detainees are released or transferred to other countries. Currently, the detainee population at Guantánamo is 174.
But Nevin said the justification the Pentagon offered for using mefloquine to presumptively treat detainees transferred to the prison beginning in 2002 “betrays a profound ignorance of basic principles of tropical medicine and suggests extremely poor, and arguably incompetent, medical oversight that demands further investigation.”
Andy Worthington is the author of The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (published by Pluto Press, distributed by Macmillan in the US, and available from Amazon — click on the following for the US and the UK) and of two other books: Stonehenge: Celebration and Subversion and The Battle of the Beanfield. To receive new articles in your inbox, please subscribe to my RSS feed (and I can also be found on Facebook and Twitter). Also see my definitive Guantánamo prisoner list, updated in July 2010, details about the new documentary film, “Outside the Law: Stories from Guantánamo” (co-directed by Polly Nash and Andy Worthington, currently on tour in the UK, and available on DVD here), and my definitive Guantánamo habeas list, and, if you appreciate my work, feel free to make a donation.
Here are some comments from Facebook:
Mike Price wrote:
Thanks for this…I’ve shared it along the quarter million plus contact lists…
Jason Leopold wrote:
Thank you so, so much Andy for highlighting this important story and for your brilliant introduction and commentary. I am incredibly grateful, my friend, and I know Jeff will be too!
Susan Hall wrote:
Thank you for caring.
Rod Such wrote:
Is it any wonder that U.S. Senator Dick Durbin compared Guantanamo to the Nazis!
Kevi Brannelly wrote:
yes, but other congressional delegates to gitmo, after the VIP show tour, called it Club Med — even tried to have reporters sample food brought back to prove it must be a good place.
Robin Laurain wrote:
Thanks Andy for keeping this on the world radar.
Andy Worthington wrote:
Thanks, everyone, but thanks in particular to Jason and Jeff. There’s more to this story that we’re all hoping to reveal.
[…] Andy Worthington Featured Writer Dandelion Salad http://www.andyworthington.co.uk 3 December, […]
[…] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Andy Worthington, Susan Blight and tosexyformy, tosexyformy. tosexyformy said: All Guantanamo Prisoners Were Subjected to Pharmacological Waterboarding | Andy Worthington: http://bit.ly/hBfm0j / lab rats! […]
Virginia Simson wrote:
Of all the revelations, this was the most distressing and SICKENING. Toxic, toxic – all of it.
Allison Lee-Clay wrote:
lovely: “Doctors Without Morals”
Adeba Khan wrote:
Sickening to the core!!
“Pharmacological Waterboarding,” a term coined by Army major Remington Nevin is an unfair characterization of a practice enacted as a “force protection” measure to prevent malaria from putting the mission at Guantanamo Bay and the population at risk. Here’s the official DoD explanation:
On Nov 22, 2010, at 2:12 PM, “Bradsher, Tanya MAJ OSD PA” wrote:
> > > Jeffrey,
> > >
> > > Mefloquine and Primaquine are appropriate and effective medications for both the treatment and prevention of the most deadly strains of malaria, Plasmodium falciparum and Plasmodium vivax. The dosage of Mefloquine 1250mg as treatment is completely appropriate as well as the dosage stated of Primaquine. A decision was made to presumptively treat each arriving Guantanamo detainee for malaria to prevent the possibility of having mosquito-borne spread from an infected individual to uninfected individuals in the
> > Guantanamo population, the guard force, the population at the
> > Naval base, or the broader Cuban population.
> > >
> > > The mefloquine dosage was entirely for public health purposes to
> > prevent the introduction of malaria to the Guantanamo area, and
> > not for any other purpose. The risks and benefits to the health
> > of the detainees were central considerations. The potential of
> > reintroducing the disease to an area that had previously been
> > malaria-free represented a true public health concern. Allowing
> > the disease to spread would have been a public health disaster.
> > >
> > > Malaria is among the top 3 global infectious disease killers in
> > the world, behind HIV/AIDS and TB. There are more deaths from
> > malaria today than there were 3 decades ago and the disease is
> > reemerging to areas where it had previously been eradicated.
> > >
> > > The most prolific strain of malaria, P.falciparum, is seen
> > worldwide but particularly in Subsaharan Africa (where it causes
> > the most deaths), Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. The next
> > dangerous species, P.vivax is also found worldwide. Malaria is
> > endemic throughout Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
> > >
> > > Medical complications of P.falciparum are quick and severe. They
> > include severe anemia, cerebral malaria (including coma and
> > permanent neurologic damage), renal failure, pulmonary failure and
> > death. Once the symptoms of this disease start, it is very
> > difficult to control and 20% die even with optimal treatment.
> > Medical complications of P.vivax include splenic rupture and
> > possible death.
> > >
> > > US military personnel coming from the US to Cuba are not
> > prophylaxed against malaria. Thanks to effective preventive
> > medical measures, malaria has been largely eradicated from both
> > the US and Cuba and there is no need currently to provide
> > prophylaxis to troops stationed there. Due to the successful
> > treatment strategy of those detainees infected upon arrival to
> > Guantanamo, no secondary transmission occurred and the disease was
> > not reintroduced to Cuba.
> > >
> > > MAJ Tanya J. Bradsher
> > > Defense Press Operations
> > >
> > >
> > > —–Original Message—–
> > > From: Jeffrey Kaye
> > > Sent: Monday, November 22, 2010 4:30 PM
> > > To: Bradsher, Tanya MAJ OSD PA
> > > Subject: Re: Re mefloquine inquiry
> > >
> > > Maj. Bradsher,
> > >
> > > Thanks so much. I know I’ll know soon after you. I appreciate
> > your diligence.
> > >
> > > Best,
> > > Jeff
> > >
> > >
> > > Jeffrey Kaye, Ph.D.
Mntgomery J. Granger
Major, Medical Service
U.S. Army Reserve (Ret.)
Author of “Saving Grace at Guantanamo Bay: A Memoir of a Citizen Warrior,” Strategic Book Publishing 2010
[…] to All Guantánamo Detainees Akin to ‘Pharmacologic Waterboarding’” (which I cross-posted here, with commentary). In that article, they revealed how, in the months following the opening of […]
Wikipedia on Mefloquinine says it is also known as lariam: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lariam
This American Life ran a story on an American in India who lost his memory apparently due to lariam, here: http://www.thisamericanlife.org/play_full.php?play=399&act=3
He says if it happens again “I am going to throw myself off the roof.”
1. Lariam is not (at least at this time) used as a first line drug for treatment of or prevention of malaria.
2. Lariam was reported by CBS in January 2003 as a suspect drug http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/27/60II/main538144.shtml
3. The McLean incident reported in This American Life took place in October 2002. This time period is “in the ball park”, although January and February of 2002 were the big months for Guantanamo.
The date for the CBS news story is 2002, not the 2009 in the by-line posted on the website.
Here is another reference to the events that makes that clear
“During a six-week span in 2002, four soldiers from Fort Bragg were accused of killing their wives”
Thanks for the research and the links, Martin. Very interesting. I’ll forward them to Jeff Kaye.
Andy, over on another site Chris Floyd published an article on Shaker Aamer that starts off by quoting you. Montgomery Granger called you an “Islamist apologist”</b.
Here is a reply I left to Dr Granger:
@Montgomery Granger — I’ve read Mr Worthington’s book, and just about anything he has written about Guantanamo. You characterized him as an “Islamist”. If, by this, you meant he was a follower of Islam than I call you out and point out that there is nothing in his writings to imply Mr Worthington follows Islam.
What do you mean by characterizing him as an “apologist”. At no point in his writings has Mr Worthington ever tried to make excuses for any war crtimes committed by the very small percentage of Guantanamo captives who were genuine war criminals.
If you meant to imply Mr Worthington is at fault for defending the right of the remaining 98 percent of the captives to peaceful follow Islam, then shame on you.
All I know about Mr Aamer’s career, Mr Aamer’s status, is what has been openly published. I am not aware of anyone else openly publishing the explanation for Mr Aamer’s continued detention that he refuses repatriation to the Saudi Arabia. Either this is wild speculation on your part, or you are a member of the US defense or intelligence establishment, who is leaking a secret. If so you should face all the same questions, all the same charges as John Kirakou, Private Manning, Matthew Diaz or Edward Snowden.
If yours is just wild speculation, then explain this — why was the USA putting pressure on the UK to accept ALL the Guantanamo captives who had had legal permission for long term residency?
Nine Guantanamo captives were UK citizens. They were all repatriated in 2004 or 2005. Nine Guantanamo captives had residency permission for long term residency in the UK. For several years there was speculation as to whether the UK would accept these men back, or whether they would withdraw that permission and require those men to be repatriated back to their country of birth.
Then the disgraceful details of how two of the UK residents got sent to Guantanamo. Bisher al-Rawi was a law-abding individual, with no ties to terrorism, who came from the same part of Syria as Abu Qatada, and was acquainted with Abu Qatada. MI-5 employed al-Rawi to help them keep Abu Qatada under surviellance. MI-5 encouraged al-Rawi to run minor errands for Abu Qatada. And, when Abu Qatada decided he needed to go underground, they had al-Rawi tell him he would search for and rent a discrete apartment where he could hide out to avoid MI-5 scrutiny.
Of course MI-5 had al-Rawi take Abu Qatada to an apartment that was completely bugged.
After Abu Qatada was finally apprehended, after hiding out in the completely bugged apartment, MI-5 could have given al-Rawi a hearty thank you. They could have given him a cash pay-out, or a medal. Instead they tried to get him to agree to go undercover and penetrate al Qaeda networks.
Dangerous spy missions should be undertaken by volunteers. Bisher al-Rawi, a married man, with a young family, declined to volunteer for what could be a suicide mission. So, in a disgraceful betrayal, UK security officials collaborated with the CIA
snatch teams to engineer his kidnapping and transport into the CIA’s archipelago of secret torture camps.
US and UK Security officials’ plan was to BLACKMAIL and TORTURE al-Rawi until he agreed to try to insert himself as a mole into al Qaeda.
When UK citizens learned that UK resident Bisher al-Rawi had been an MI-5 informant, not a terrorist, there was pressure for him to be transferred back to the UK. The USA and the UK entered into a negotiation over this transfer that lasted for several years.
Like Shaker Aamer his transfer should have been a simple matter. After several years of frustration members of the UK negotiation team leaked details of the draconian demands US negotiators were trying to insist on.
First, the USA would not release al-Rawi to the UK unless the UK agreed to accept the other eight former UK residents.
Second, the USA would not release al-Rawi to the UK unless the UK agreed to either put the released men into detention, in the UK, or subjected them to draconian, around the clock surviellance.
UK negotiators pointed out that, since there appeared to be no evidence that any of these men had ever actually committed a crime, UK law did not permit the UK to continue to detain them, or to subject them to indefinite 24×7 surviellance. UK negotiators pointed out that 24×7 surviellance was also very expensive, and would appear to be an enormous waste of money.
Bisher al-Rawi and seven of the other eight UK residents were eventually transferred back to the UK. Even Benjamin Mohamed, another individual who was tortured in the CIA torture program was repatriated.
Some commentators think that the US military was willing to see Benjamin Mohamed released, since he had been tortured by the CIA, but they are unwilling to see Aamer released because he was tortured in Guantanamo, by the US military, years after the Bush administration had clawed back permission to torture in Guantanamo.
Excellent, arcticredriver. Thank you for your detailed analysis of – primarily – Bisher al-Rawi’s case, and what can be learned from it about the treatment of Shaker.
I was glad that Chris Floyd covered the story. He has been doing great work for many years.
Investigative journalist, author, filmmaker, photographer and Guantanamo expert
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