On Thursday, a group of US citizens in Massachusetts were thrilled to hear that, in the District Court in Washington D.C., Judge Henry H. Kennedy Jr. had granted the habeas corpus petition of Ravil Mingazov, the last Russian prisoner in Guantánamo, who was seized in Pakistan in March 2002.
Few people in America have heard of Mingazov, but the residents of Amherst and Leverett know about him because, on November 4, 2009, and April 24, 2010, Town Meetings in both towns passed resolutions offering him a new home — and also offering a new home to Ahmed Belbacha, an Algerian who was cleared for release in 2007. The resolutions also urged Congress to repeal legislation passed last year, preventing any former Guantánamo prisoner from entering the United States except for prosecution.
The resolutions were proposed by Amherst resident Ruth Hooke and Leverett resident Elizabeth Adams. Both are members of No More Guantánamos, “a coalition of concerned US residents, communities, organizations, and attorneys who are working together to ensure justice for the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, Bagram air base in Afghanistan, and other offshore prison sites maintained by the CIA and the Pentagon around the world.” The organization’s director, Nancy Talanian, explained that the organization’s chapters around the country “choose one or two detainees and share the men’s stories through events, literature, and media to show the public that all Guantánamo detainees are human beings who deserve basic human rights, rather than the monsters that some government officials have described.”
“Our Pioneer Valley chapter chose Ravil Mingazov and Ahmed Belbacha last spring,” she added. “Although Ravil had not yet been cleared, our members were confident that he had done nothing wrong and should be released. We are very happy that the judge agrees.”
What the people of Amherst and Leverett had recognized was that Mingazov was an innocent man, seized as the result of an unfortunate chain of events, whose release from Guantánamo is long overdue. Although his story is unique, it shares similarities with the stories of other refugees who ended up in Guantánamo, and also sheds light on the stories of nine other prisoners, still held in the prison. Like Ravil Mingazov, their presence in Pakistan in 2002, for reasons unconnected with any kind of militant activity, has doomed them to eight long years in Guantánamo, because the US authorities erroneously concluded that there was a meaningful connection between the house they were staying in when they were seized, and the supposed “high-value detainee” Abu Zubaydah, who was seized on the same night.
Ravil Mingazov, a refugee from injustice in Russia
Born in 1967, Mingazov was a ballet dancer, who performed with a number of dance troupes. When he was 19, he was conscripted into the Russian Army, serving for two years in the Army’s ballet troupe. He then served as a volunteer until 1996, when he took a job in the military’s food supply section, transforming an ailing program into one that was recognized as “the best in all the Army’s.”
Mingazov’s troubles only began when he converted to Islam during his service, and discovered that there was widespread intolerance towards Muslim soldiers. When his requests for halal food and prayer time were denied, he took his complaints to his mayor and to a political party, provoking retaliation from his superiors. After the KGB stepped in, ransacking his house, he decided to seek a new country where he could live freely with his wife and his young child.
With his request for a passport denied without explanation, he traveled south to Afghanistan, intending to send for his wife and child once he had located a suitable place for them to live. This could have been Afghanistan, which, before the 9/11 attacks, provided sanctuary to numerous Muslim refugees fleeing religious persecution, but Mingazov’s quest was derailed following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, and his story took a dramatic turn for the worse after he fled with other refugees to a center in Lahore, in Pakistan, run by the vast missionary organization Jama’at-al-Tablighi, where he stayed from January to March 2002.
Although Mingazov was safe in the Tablighi center, he was anxious to return to his wife and child, but was prey to the prevailing opportunism regarding foreigners in Pakistan, who were being sold to the US military for bounty payments. It was at this point that he and two other refugees, Labed Ahmed (an Algerian) and Jamil Nassir (a Yemeni) were offered safe passage to a house in Faisalabad, where, they were told, it would be easier for them to leave the country.
Ahmed, a former drug dealer in Europe, who had been imprisoned several times in Germany and Italy, had ended up in Lahore after being recruited to fight with the Taliban, and had reached Lahore via a safe house in Bannu, in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province. He was released from Guantánamo in November 2008, but during his detention he explained that, in Lahore, he had been told to go to Faisalabad, “where some people would come to give him his passport and send him back to Germany.” He added that he and two other people, a Russian (Mingazov) and a Yemeni (Nassir), decided to allow themselves to be taken to Faisalabad, but that, after they arrived, at a place called Shabaz Cottage, they were told that they had been brought there by mistake and would be moved to another house after the evening prayer.
The tenuous connection to “high-value detainee” Abu Zubaydah
What none of the men knew at the time was that Shabaz Cottage was being rented by Abu Zubaydah, the former gatekeeper of the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan, and that the house was under surveillance. As Ahmed explained, however, his only concern was that the house was “big and nice” and “everybody had their own room,” whereas the previous houses he had stayed in had been crowded. As a result, when a vehicle arrived to move the three men elsewhere, Ahmed insisted on staying. He added that, several days later, “The guy from al-Qaeda, Daoud [identified in the hearing as Abu Zubaydah] questioned me as to who I was, what I was doing here and who brought me. I said I’m from Germany waiting on my passport. When I get it, I will leave. He said, no problem, you can stay here for a week. I stayed there for about 12 days and the Pakistani police came. They took us to prison. Daoud was arrested with us, you can ask him about us.”
For Ravil Mingazov and Jamil Nassir, their relocation was no more successful, because the house they were taken to — the Crescent Mill guest house (also referred to as the “Issa” guest house, after its owner, and “the Yemeni house,” after most of its guests) — was raided on the same night that Abu Zubayadah, Labed Ahmed and others were seized in a bloody raid on Shabaz Cottage, and Mingazov and Nassir were seized along with 13 others, who all ended up in Guantánamo, where one of them — Ali Abdullah Ahmed al-Salami — died in mysterious circumstances in June 2006, allegedly as part of a triple suicide.
Judge Kennedy’s unclassified opinion has not yet been made available, so it is unclear why he approved Mingazov’s release, but it is almost certain that he concluded that Mingazov had no connection to Abu Zubaydah. This should have been clear to the US government for some time, for two particular reasons. The first is that, during a military review board at Guantánamo, Labed Ahmed stated that, because he, Mingazov and Nassir “did not have a connection or relationship with Abu Zubaydah,” they “should have been placed in the Yemeni house.”
This indicates that, although Abu Zubaydah had some sort of contact with the house, it was not a place that had any connection with terrorism, and was, at best, a place where a few foreigners fleeing from Afghanistan could be concealed alongside a group of students. Moreover, this analysis was reinforced last May, when Judge Gladys Kessler granted the habeas corpus petition of Alla Ali Bin Ali Ahmed, a Yemeni who was also seized in the house. Accepting that Ali Ahmed was a student, and that the government’s supposed evidence relied, to an intolerable degree, on statements made by unreliable witnesses in Guantánamo, Judge Kessler made a point of noting, “It is likely, based on evidence in the record, that at least a majority of the [redacted] guests were indeed students, living at a guest house that was located close to a university.”
Abu Zubaydah and a global web of tortured confessions
For the rest of the men seized in the Crescent Mill guest house, Judge Kessler’s ruling should have provided encouragement to the government to secure their release, but this has not been the case. In fact, the government hesitated about even releasing Ali Ahmed, explaining, as the New York Times described it last October, that officials had stated, “Even if Mr. Ahmed was not dangerous in 2002 … Guantánamo itself might have radicalized him, exposing him to militants and embittering him against the United States.” With this kind of mentality, no one would ever be released from Guantánamo under any circumstances, and it no doubt helps to explain why only three other survivors of the Crescent Mill raid have been released in the last year: Abdul Aziz al-Noofayee, a Saudi, who was released last June, and two other Yemenis, Mohammed Tahir and Fayad Yahya Ahmed, who were released in December.
Beyond highlighting the ongoing plight of the nine remaining men — all Yemenis, apart from one Palestinian — Judge Kennedy’s ruling is also noteworthy because it once more sheds light on the case of Abu Zubaydah. Despite the existence of evidence demonstrating that Zubaydah was nothing more than a mentally damaged training camp facilitator, and that the Khaldan camp had nothing more than a tenuous connection to al-Qaeda, the Bush administration decided that he was, in fact, a high-ranking member of al-Qaeda, and set about interrogating him using an experimental torture program. This was formalized on August 1, 2002, when John Yoo and Jay S. Bybee, lawyers in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, which is charged with objectively interpreting the law as it applies to the executive branch, cynically attempted to redefine torture so that it could be used by the CIA with some sort of legal cover.
Attempts to hold Yoo and Bybee to account for their actions have so far been unsuccessful, but what is even more shocking than the attempt to give legal cover to a torture program supported at the highest levels of the Bush administration is the fact that intelligence assessments of Abu Zubaydah’s significance were so mistaken. As the Washington Post explained last March, after talking to “former senior government officials who closely followed [his] interrogations,” the torture of Zubaydah — which included waterboarding (a form of controlled drowning), confinement in tiny, coffin-like boxes, extreme violence, prolonged isolation, and the use of sustained nudity and loud music and noise — was so worthless that “not a single significant plot was foiled” as a result of it. Instead, his false confessions, extracted through the use of torture, led only to a global web of false allegations — implicating men as far afield as Canada and Europe — that has not yet been unraveled, and whose scale is, as yet, unknown.
Ravil Mingazov and the remaining occupants of the Crescent Mill guest house were not directly implicated in Zubaydah’s torture, as they were seized on the same night as him, but they are victims of the hysteria that greeted and followed his capture. While Zubaydah himself remains in Guantánamo’s secretive Camp 7 for “high-value detainees,” even though there appears to be no way that he can ever be prosecuted, Ravil Mingazov may now be more fortunate. Eight years after he made false statements in Bagram about attending an al-Qaeda training camp and listening to a lecture on jihad by Osama bin Laden, which he did because he was fearful of being forcibly returned to Russia, the State Department must now find a new country that is prepared to accept him instead of his home country — and the government will, hopefully, also consider the cases of the men seized with him in Pakistan on that fear-charged night back in March 2002.
Given Congress’s ban on bringing any cleared prisoners to the US mainland, it is doubtful that officials will pay any heed to the offer made by the people of Amherst and Leverett, but this is a great shame. As Nancy Talanian explained on Thursday, “Congress’s blanket ban on allowing any of the men to live here is standing in the way of the prison’s closure, which we believe will make Americans safer. Guantánamo detainees who cannot safely return home are really no different than other refugees whom western Mass. communities have welcomed in the past. And if the US government, which has held the men for more than eight years, claims [they] would not pose any danger if they are sent to live in allied countries, that should be sufficient assurance that we can be safe with some of them living here.”
Logic and compassion, however, are in short supply in a country still bewitched by the Bush administration’s groundless but enduring rhetoric about Guantánamo containing “the worst of the worst.” Amherst and Leverett may not succeed in welcoming Ravil Mingazov or Ahmed Belbacha to live in Pioneer Valley, but their example should inspire other US citizens to join the movement to make America accountable for its own mistakes, and to call on Congress to allow other wrongly imprisoned men to settle in the United States.
Andy Worthington is the author of The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (published by Pluto Press, distributed by Macmillan in the US, and available from Amazon — click on the following for the US and the UK). To receive new articles in your inbox, please subscribe to my RSS feed (and I can also be found on Facebook and Twitter). Also see my definitive Guantánamo prisoner list, updated in January 2010, details about the new documentary film, “Outside the Law: Stories from Guantánamo” (co-directed by Polly Nash and Andy Worthington, and currently on tour in the UK), my definitive Guantánamo habeas list, and, if you appreciate my work, feel free to make a donation.
For an overview of all the habeas rulings, including links to all my articles, and to the judges’ unclassified opinions, see: Guantánamo Habeas Results: The Definitive List. For a sequence of articles dealing with the Guantánamo habeas cases, see: Guantánamo and the Supreme Court: the most important habeas corpus case in modern history and Guantánamo and the Supreme Court: What Happened? (both December 2007), The Supreme Court’s Guantánamo ruling: what does it mean? (June 2008), Guantánamo as Alice in Wonderland (Uighurs’ first court victory, June 2008), What’s Happening with the Guantánamo cases? (July 2008), Government Says Six Years Is Not Long Enough To Prepare Evidence (September 2008), From Guantánamo to the United States: The Story of the Wrongly Imprisoned Uighurs (October 2008), Guantánamo Uyghurs’ resettlement prospects skewered by Justice Department lies (October 2008), Guilt By Torture: Binyam Mohamed’s Transatlantic Quest for Justice (November 2008), After 7 Years, Judge Orders Release of Guantánamo Kidnap Victims (November 2008), Is Robert Gates Guilty of Perjury in Guantánamo Torture Case? (December 2008), A New Year Message to Barack Obama: Free the Guantánamo Uighurs (January 2009), The Top Ten Judges of 2008 (January 2009), No End in Sight for the “Enemy Combatants” of Guantánamo (January 2009), Judge Orders Release of Guantánamo’s Forgotten Child (January 2009), How Cooking For The Taliban Gets You Life In Guantánamo (January 2009), Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics (February 2009), Bad News And Good News For The Guantánamo Uighurs (February 2009), The Nobodies Formerly Known As Enemy Combatants (March 2009), Farce at Guantánamo, as cleared prisoner’s habeas petition is denied (April 2009), Obama’s First 100 Days: A Start On Guantánamo, But Not Enough (May 2009), Judge Condemns “Mosaic” Of Guantánamo Intelligence, And Unreliable Witnesses (May 2009), Pain At Guantánamo And Paralysis In Government (May 2009), Guantánamo: A Prison Built On Lies (May 2009), Free The Guantánamo Uighurs! (May 2009), Guantánamo And The Courts (Part One): Exposing The Bush Administration’s Lies (July 2009), Obama’s Failure To Deliver Justice To The Last Tajik In Guantánamo (July 2009), Obama And The Deadline For Closing Guantánamo: It’s Worse Than You Think (July 2009), How Judge Huvelle Humiliated The Government In Guantánamo Case (Mohamed Jawad, July 2009), As Judge Orders Release Of Tortured Guantánamo Prisoner, Government Refuses To Concede Defeat (Mohamed Jawad, July 2009), Guantánamo As Hotel California: You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, But You Can Never Leave (August 2009), Judge Orders Release From Guantánamo Of Kuwaiti Charity Worker (August 2009), Guantánamo And The Courts (Part Two): Obama’s Shame (August 2009), Guantánamo And The Courts (Part Three): Obama’s Continuing Shame (August 2009), No Escape From Guantánamo: The Latest Habeas Rulings (September 2009), First Guantánamo Prisoner To Lose Habeas Hearing Appeals Ruling (September 2009), A Truly Shocking Guantánamo Story: Judge Confirms That An Innocent Man Was Tortured To Make False Confessions (September 2009), 75 Guantánamo Prisoners Cleared For Release; 31 Could Leave Today (September 2009), Resisting Injustice In Guantánamo: The Story Of Fayiz Al-Kandari (October 2009), Justice Department Pointlessly Gags Guantánamo Lawyer (November 2009), Judge Orders Release Of Algerian From Guantánamo (But He’s Not Going Anywhere) (November 2009), Innocent Guantánamo Torture Victim Fouad al-Rabiah Is Released In Kuwait (December 2009), What Does It Take To Get Out Of Obama’s Guantánamo? (December 2009), “Model Prisoner” at Guantánamo, Tortured in the “Dark Prison,” Loses Habeas Corpus Petition (December 2009), Judge Orders Release From Guantánamo Of Unwilling Yemeni Recruit (December 2009), Serious Problems With Obama’s Plan To Move Guantánamo To Illinois (December 2009), Appeals Court Extends President’s Wartime Powers, Limits Guantánamo Prisoners’ Rights (January 2010), Fear and Paranoia as Guantánamo Marks its Eighth Anniversary (January 2010), Rubbing Salt in Guantánamo’s Wounds: Task Force Announces Indefinite Detention (January 2010), The Black Hole of Guantánamo (March 2010), Guantánamo Uighurs Back in Legal Limbo (March 2010), Guantánamo and Habeas Corpus: The Torture Victim and the Taliban Recruit (April 2010), An Insignificant Yemeni at Guantánamo Loses His Habeas Petition (April 2010), With Regrets, Judge Allows Indefinite Detention at Guantánamo of a Medic (April 2010), Mohamedou Ould Salahi: How a Judge Demolished the US Government’s Al-Qaeda Claims (April 2010), Judge Rules Yemeni’s Detention at Guantánamo Based Solely on Torture (April 2010), Why Judges Can’t Free Torture Victims from Guantánamo (April 2010), How Binyam Mohamed’s Torture Was Revealed in a US Court (May 2010), Guantánamo and Habeas Corpus: Consigning Soldiers to Oblivion (May 2010), Judge Denies Habeas Petition of an Ill and Abused Libyan in Guantánamo (May 2010).
Also see: Justice extends to Bagram, Guantánamo’s Dark Mirror (April 2009), Judge Rules That Afghan “Rendered” To Bagram In 2002 Has No Rights (July 2009), Bagram Isn’t The New Guantánamo, It’s The Old Guantánamo (August 2009), Obama Brings Guantánamo And Rendition To Bagram (And Not The Geneva Conventions) and Is Bagram Obama’s New Secret Prison? (both September 2009), Dark Revelations in the Bagram Prisoner List (January 2010), Bagram: Graveyard of the Geneva Conventions (February 2010).
[…] had trained in Yemen), and — although I expect hell to freeze over before this comes to pass — renewing calls for cleared prisoners who cannot be repatriated because they face the risk of torture to be allowed […]
[…] weeks ago, the Russian, Ravil Mingazov, won his habeas petition, and last Wednesday, Mohammed Hassen also secured a victory. The judge in both cases was Henry H. […]
[…] in Yemen), and – although I expect hell to freeze over before this comes to pass – renewing calls for cleared prisoners who cannot be repatriated because they face the risk of torture to be allowed […]
Andy, Ravel Mingazov is in the news again, and as I was thinking about him I revisited the online pages where you wrote about him.
I left a long comment at your page from 13.9.07 entitled Guantánamo Transcripts: “Ghost” Prisoners Speak After Five And A Half Years, And “9/11 hijacker” Recants His Tortured Confession. In that comment I offered my opinion that Salafi University was so loosely run that it wasn’t necessary for Abu Zubaydah to rent the house where the 16 men were captured. It was my impression after reading their testimony that none of the students in that house had to pay any tuition, submit any high school grades, or pass a real admissions test, to register at Salafi University. It was my impression that this house, and the houses where students slept were so loosely run that anyone who was prepared to act pious, was allowed to stay there, so long as they said they were about to apply, or were thinking of applying, to be students at the University.
Anyhow, it should have been good news for Mingazov, that the judge in his habeas case determined that there was insufficient evidence to justify his detention, and that he should be released.
Judge Kennedy’s ruling opens an ugly question. In October 2013 some of Carol Rosenberg’s excellent work paid off. She had helped her paper, the Miami Herald, to submit a Freedom of Information Act request for how the Guantanamo Review Task Force which President Obama set up to supplant OARDEC had classified the remaining captives.
Both the Review Task Force and Justice Kennedy had access to the same classified information. The Review Task Force’s conclusion was that Mingazov should be “referred for prosecution”, while Kennedy ruled he should be released.
What the heck? In a fair trial the prosecution’s goal is to satisfy the judge, or jury if it is a jury trial, that the suspect is guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt”, whatever that means. But, whatever it is supposed to mean all legal scholars recognize that the prosecution’s goal in a habeas review is more modest. They merely have to convince the judge that there is enough evidence of guilt to justify continued detention and a trial.
If the prosecution couldn’t convince Justice Kennedy that there was enough evidence to justify his continued detention then how was the Review Task Force convinced there was enough evidence to justify laying charges?
Sadly, I think part of the answer is that a Guantanamo military commission is not a fair trial.
Sadly, I think part of the rest of the answer is that the secrecy with which the US intelligence establishment is allowed to continue to cloak their operations is almost always unnecessary, damages public safety, and is being allowed to obfuscate bonehead mistakes, and squander billions of dollars on wild-goose chases that build the careers of opportunists who don’t give a darn about public safety.
There is a long-running mailing list called RISKS, devoted to risks to public safety through technology. It is moderated, by a senior and respected computer scientist, so it is well respected. He has a weakness for puns, so it can be funny. Some of the items reported there have extremely funny aspects. Others are heartbreaking.
The reason I bring it up is that I think those in the intelligence community should learn from how computer scientists approach computer security. They laugh at what they call “security through obscurity”. Keeping the algorithms used in proprietary voting machines secret would be an example of security through obscurity. So would keeping secret the algorithms used in a program intended to prevent one’s children or employees from visiting “bad” sites on the internet.
Computer scientists who specialize in secure communication advocate publishing the source code, so it is available for peer review. Those who develop a program can get tunnel vision, so they overlook flaws that a new set of eyes will recognize.
I think if the US intelligence establishment were forced to vastly relax what information was kept secret we would see that the conclusions they have drawn were narrow-minded, and ultimately very damaging to public safety. I think public safety would be greatly served by open-ness. I predict that when Ravil Mingazov’s secret dossier is finally declassified 30 years from now, we will find the justifications for charging him will evaporate.
I’ll close this comment with a recounting of an example from computer security. In the 1990s, when the general public was first starting to use the internet, Mattel, the toy manufacturer, threw its hat in the ring with a new product called “cyber patrol”, that, when installed, would keep one’s children or employees from visiting bad sites. Mattel emploed spin doctors, like Commander Gordon, to make vast claims about what an invaluable tool it was. How it actually worked was kept secret. Customers would have to rely on the spin doctors’ wildly inflated vague claims, and on Mattel’s reputation.
Well, a pair of young grad students decided to play detective, and figure out how the product actually operated. All it did was look at every internet URL the user wanted the computer to visit, and filter it through a blacklist. If the URL banged up against a rule generated from the blacklist the computer would be stopped from visiting that site.
Well, there are respected systems now that use this technique. But they don’t keep their blacklists secret. The grad students determined that Cyber Patrol used an encrypted blacklist, that was regularly update, but one which used very weak encryption. So they decrypted the blacklist, and published it.
And everyone who read it broke out in laughter. Clearly a tool like this is only as good as its blacklist, and once published, this blacklist was both shockingly amateurish, and really quite damaging to anyone’s attempt to use the computer for useful work.
To protect one’s vulnerable children from bad news the rules didn’t allow the computer to visit any site the blacklist identified as a news site. It didn’t allow the computer to visit any site that contained the words penis, vagina, or breast — or any popular euphemism for them. So, at a time when University sites were a lot more widely visited than they are today, no one would be allowed to visit any web page at Carnegie Mellon University — because a woman’s bosoms are sometimes colloquially known as “melons”. Finally the blacklist had a list of specific sites users’ couldn’t visit.
As news of the grad student’s work started to be published Mattel started bombarding their customers with updated blacklists, where they added any site that discussed their embarrassment.
Mattel sicked really mean aggressive lawyers on these poor grad students. They were told that, even if Mattel didn’t have legitimate grounds to sue them, Mattel would bankrupt them, by filing appeals, and exhausting their ability to hire lawyers to fight the appeals.
After a week or so the poor grad students signed over their remaining intellectual property rights to their work, and agreed to remain silent, in return for Mattel dropping the law-suit. Mattel’s lawyers then focussed on third party commentators, who had written about the grad student’s work, or were mirroring their report or their source code. Steve Mann, a professor at UofT, and an early pioneer in wearable computers was one of those who mirrored the grad student’s work was one of those who stood up to Mattel’s bullying lawyers. He pointed out that he had no obligation to take down his copy of the grad student’s work — even if they had signed over all their remaining right to it to Mattel, because they had released it under a free license like that used for the Linux operating system, and they had already given away the right to claw back their work.
Anyhow, I am utterly convinced that, if the US intelligence establishment was forced to open up their now classified files to public review, we would find it riddled with equally ridiculous bad work. Of course it would deeply, painfully tragicomic, due to the enormous loss of innocent life already caused by taking the bad reasoning at face value.
Thanks, arcticredriver. I absolutely agree with your comment that “Salafi University was so loosely run that it wasn’t necessary for Abu Zubaydah to rent the house where the 16 men were captured. It was my impression after reading their testimony that none of the students in that house had to pay any tuition, submit any high school grades, or pass a real admissions test, to register at Salafi University. It was my impression that this house, and the houses where students slept were so loosely run that anyone who was prepared to act pious, was allowed to stay there, so long as they said they were about to apply, or were thinking of applying, to be students at the University.”
I also endorse your comments about “the secrecy with which the US intelligence establishment is allowed to continue to cloak their operations,” which “is almost always unnecessary, damages public safety, and is being allowed to obfuscate bonehead mistakes, and squander billions of dollars on wild-goose chases that build the careers of opportunists who don’t give a darn about public safety.”
I also think it’s clear that Mingazov was a nobody, and recommending him for prosecution only shows how over-cautious Obama’s task force was, but as those of us who have studied Guantanamo closely are aware, it was always implausible that the task force found a total of 84 men to recommend for prosecution or for ongoing detention on the basis that they were “too dangerous to release,” because that number should never have been more than a few dozen.
I once wondered if 80 (more or less) was the US establishment’s minimum acceptable figure for alleged dangerousness, to prevent the laughable truth from being known – that only about 3 percent of the nearly 800 men held had any significance. At 10 percent (80), the authorities could at least continue to pretend to claim that there had been some purpose to their purposeless experiment.
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