This article was originally published on November 27, 2007. For updated information, please check out the links (by prisoner name and number) in my four-part definitive Guantánamo prisoner list, last updated on April 25, 2012.
Chapter 4 of The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (Pluto Press, November 2007) tells the stories of 19 prisoners who were captured after the much-touted but ultimately unsuccessful Tora Bora campaign in late November and early December 2001.
After recruiting a handful of mostly dubious local Afghan warlords, the American forces’ distant commanders in Florida and Kuwait paid for these men and their hastily assembled armies of recruits –- accompanied by just a few dozen Special Forces operatives, who called in devastating air raids –- to take on the al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who had been holed up in the mountains since abandoning the eastern city of Jalalabad on November 13. According to an array of authoritative reports, the Americans’ reluctance to commit troops in large numbers to secure the escape routes to Pakistan enabled all the most significant targets in Tora Bora –- bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, other senior al-Qaeda figures, and a host of Taliban leaders –- to escape unscathed to the border areas of Pakistan, where they successfully went to ground.
Those captured at this time –- probably no more than 50 men, at most –- seem to have included a handful of soldiers from Tora Bora itself, a larger group of mixed provenance –- soldiers, humanitarian aid workers and other civilians –- who were wounded in a US bombing raid while attempting to cross into Pakistan, and a handful of stragglers picked up in or around Jalalabad. At the time of writing, just four of these 19 men had been released, and a fifth, Abdullah al-Anazi (see photo) was released in September 2007, as reported here.
Some of the prisoners described in the book –- those targeted in the US bombing raid –- ended up in a hospital in Jalalabad, under the supervision of the Northern Alliance, before being handed over to the Americans. One who was not mentioned is Omar al-Dayi, a 25-year old Yemeni who, like the majority of the Yemenis, is still held in Guantánamo. Al-Dayi, who weighed just 98 pounds (seven stone) when he arrived in Guantánamo on February 15, 2002, did not attend his tribunal in 2004 –- one of the 558 Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) convened to assess whether the detainees had been correctly designated as “enemy combatants.” Although the tribunals allowed the detainees to tell their stories, they were condemned as “kangaroo courts” by lawyers and human rights groups, because the detainees were not allowed legal representation, and were not allowed to see or hear classified “evidence” that was often obtained through torture, coercion or bribery. In recent months, the tribunals have also been savaged by former military insiders who took part in them, as reported here.
Because he refused to take part in his tribunal, al-Dayi did not respond to the brief list of allegations against him: that he arrived in Pakistan in August 2001 and traveled to Kandahar where he “received weapons training,” that he was “an Arab fighter” in the Tora Bora region, and that he was “arrested in Jalalabad by US forces.” In July 2006, two years after his CSRT, having refused to take part in either round of the annual Administrative Review Boards (ARBs), which were convened to assess whether the detainees still posed a threat to US security, or whether they still had ongoing intelligence value, the allegations against him had not fundamentally changed, although additional details had been added to the “Unclassified Summary of Evidence” against him.
In this most recent version of events, it was suggested that a recruiter paid for his travel to Afghanistan in August 2001, and that he stayed at a safe house in Kandahar, but became ill with malaria after one day, and “had trouble standing and walking.” It was also alleged that, after six weeks at the safe house, all the Arabs were told to go to Jalalabad, where they stayed in another safe house for a few weeks before leaving for Tora Bora. In the mountains, it was alleged that al-Dayi “was shown to his position,” with 10-12 other Arabs, but that his group, though armed, “spent most of its time hiding in one of the three caves located close to its position.” Wounded in the leg by a missile, he was then “evacuated by an Afghan on a donkey to a nearby village,” and driven to the hospital in Jalalabad, where he stayed for two months “before being taken by Americans to a prison in Kabul” –- presumably the notorious, CIA-run “Dark Prison,” where several of the Tora Bora prisoners were held –- before being transferred to Kandahar and then Guantánamo.
Some of the prisoners captured at Tora Bora.
Khalid al-Dhuby, a 20-year old Yemeni, who was also caught up in a bombing raid, was seized by Northern Alliance soldiers. However, because he was not wounded, he was held not in Jalalabad but in an Afghan prison in Kabul before being handed over – or sold – to US forces. A simple recruit, he explained that he had been shown films of atrocities in Chechnya by a man he met at his local mosque, and that, after viewing the films, he “wanted to train even more but did not want to fight.” With his travel to Afghanistan arranged by the recruiter, he arrived at al-Farouq in late July 2001, and trained for a month and a half until the camp was closed and he was moved to a farm, where he stayed for another 15 days until he and the rest of his group were moved to the Tora Bora mountains.
There he was given a Kalashnikov rifle, “even though no one mentioned a war was going on,” and, he said, he “stayed in one of several caves large enough to fit three or four people.” After an unspecified amount of time, he left Tora Bora with his group, but as they passed through a valley he “saw planes dropping bombs on their location and stated the bombing went on for one night.” He added that he “hid from the bombs until the next morning,” but that many of the men traveling with him “were killed and injured by the bombing.” Throughout this whole experience, he maintained that he had never fired a shot at anyone, that he “was not a fighter or a killer,” and that he only “wanted to train to protect himself and his family as well as defend his country.”
Three other prisoners who were captured at this time in the Tora Bora region, but who were not caught up in the deadly bombing raid in the valley, were Abdullah al-Tayabi, a 21-year old Saudi, Nabil Hadjarab, a 22-year old Algerian, and Khalid Qasim, a 24-year old Yemeni. Al-Tayabi said that he was a mechanical engineering student, and explained that he went to Afghanistan for a month’s vacation with a friend because “I watched a lot of Hollywood movies and wanted to learn how to use pistols as a hobby.” While this seems rather implausible, he backed it up by saying, “Since there was no place to learn how to use a weapon in my country unless you are a soldier my friend suggested that we go to Afghanistan during the school break and learn. I had tried to apply to a military college but was not accepted because I was underweight.” After arriving in Afghanistan, two weeks before 9/11, he said that he met up with another Saudi and that the two of them stayed in guest houses in Kandahar and Jalalabad, but did not train at al-Farouq (the main camp for Arabs, associated with Osama bin Laden) because “we were told that they would not bring us to the training camp because they didn’t know us.” As the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, he said that he fled to the mountains, leaving his friend behind, and was captured by Afghan villagers. “Afghans kidnapped me and others and demanded money to be released,” he explained. “Some of the others were able to buy their freedom … but I didn’t have any money so I was kept in captivity.”
Nabil Hadjarab, who had been living in Paris and had then spent six months in London, said that he had traveled to Afghanistan in March 2001 to study the Koran. He denied an allegation that he trained at al-Farouq, although he admitted learning to use an AK-47 “for protection against Afghan thieves.” He also said that he stayed at a house in Jalalabad, but fled to the mountains because of the persecution of Arabs, where he hid in a trench, in a “safe place,” for 20-25 days, but was then betrayed by some Afghans “he trusted,” who “first delivered him to second people, then they sold him to the Americans.”
Khalid Qasim, whose brother was apparently apprehended by the Yemeni authorities in connection with the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, said that he had traveled to Afghanistan in late 1999, but denied undertaking any military training, and claimed, without much credibility, that he had sat around in guest houses for two years. He admitted, however, that he was in the Tora Bora mountains in November 2001, when, stretching the bounds of belief once more, he and the people he was with were addressed by Osama bin Laden, who, he said, “was just passing by and said ‘hi’ and went on his way.” He also denied that he was with al-Qaeda fighters, saying that he didn’t know that the people were al-Qaeda. After hiding in caves for several weeks, he said that he and his companions descended from the mountains when one of them was injured, which was when they were arrested.
By the time of Qasim’s second ARB in July 2006 (which he did not attend), the US authorities had managed to piece together a more convincing itinerary, which involved him being recruited for jihad after responding to a fatwa, stating that he “originally wanted to fight in Kashmir, because Muslims were being killed there,” attending al-Farouq on two occasions, and spending some time on the Taliban front lines, although it was not clear how much truth there was to additional allegations that he “has been identified as an al-Qaeda instructor,” who trained fighters at “an unidentified location” near Bagram airbase, that he “was in charge of a group at Tora Bora,” and that he “has been identified as somebody who is experienced in explosives and was an instructor at al-Farouq.”
One other prisoner, who did not attend his tribunal, was also apparently captured in the Tora Bora region. Ahmed Kuman, a 20-year old Yemeni, was accused of traveling to Afghanistan in response to a fatwa issued by the octogenarian Sheikh Hamoud al-Uqla, one the most notorious pro-Taliban radical clerics in Saudi Arabia, training at several camps including al-Farouq, and fighting against the US-led coalition in Bagram and Tora Bora. He was reportedly captured during Ramadan by the Northern Alliance.
By the time of Kuman’s second ARB in January 2006 (which he also did not attend), the US authorities had built up a more detailed profile of his activities, but it was unclear whether the allegations were necessarily reliable. Apparently identified “at a guest house on the Taliban front lines in Kabul” in late 1999, he was also “identified as the bus driver for a guest house in Kandahar,” was “seen in Tora Bora,” where he “was a fighter,” was “identified as suspected al-Qaeda due to his association with the Kandahar Airport group,” and was identified “as having been a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden.” While some of these claims sound unnervingly like “confessions” produced under dubious circumstances by Kuman’s fellow detainees, it was also alleged that he “claimed he was personal friends with Osama bin Laden’s son,” that bin Laden “was like a father to him,” and that he claimed he had access to bin Laden “at any time because of this relationship.” Although there have been no reports of how Kuman has been treated in Guantanamo, it appears that he has been a consistent hunger striker. He weighed just 115 pounds (8 stone 3 pounds) on arrival, in May 2002, and has rarely weighed more than nine stone in the five and a half years since. At one point, in January 2004, his weight dropped to just 91 pounds (six and a half stone).
Others had different, non-military explanations for being in Afghanistan. The stories of two of these men were bafflingly vague. Nawaf al-Otaibi, a 29-year old Saudi (released in May 2006), was accused of traveling to Afghanistan in June 2001 and training at a Libyan camp. It was also alleged that he “was identified as being captured in Tora Bora,” although he stated that he did not receive any training and never possessed a weapon while he was in Afghanistan, and added that, if given the opportunity to return home, he would “seek employment as a school teacher.”
In the case of Mohammed Haidel, a 23-year old Yemeni, who came up with what appeared to be the lamest of cover stories in his tribunal –- “I went to get married and for a change of environment” –- the Americans were, nevertheless, unable initially to come up with any allegations that he was involved in military training or combat. Instead, they claimed that he was “in Tora Bora during the US air campaign,” that he was “injured by a bomb blast in Tora Bora,” and that he was “captured by Northern Alliance forces during his retreat from Tora Bora.”
These allegations had been ramped up by the time of his second ARB in June 2006 (which he did not attend), when it was alleged that he trained at al-Farouq, was sent to the front lines in Kabul, where “he spent a lot of time sitting around and guarding,” and was then driven east, with other fighters, to Tora Bora, “where he sat in a cave for fifteen days,” and was then injured by a bomb blast, captured by the Northern Alliance and taken to a prison in Kabul, before being handed over to the Americans. Although a great deal of attention was devoted to his recruitment for jihad in Yemen, in which the situations in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Palestine were apparently explained to him, his lack of understanding of what he had embarked on was made clear in a statement attributed to him, in which he said that he “wanted to go to Afghanistan to prepare himself to fight because Jews were killing innocent Palestinians and the same thing was happening in Afghanistan.” Also a hunger striker in Guantánamo, Haidel, who weighed just 105 pounds (seven and a half stone) on arrival in May 2002, has rarely weighed more in the five and a half years since. In November 2002, his weight dropped to just 90 pounds (6 stone 6 pounds), and at the time that the declassified weight records came to an end, in November 2006, he weighed just 102 pounds (7 stone 4 pounds).
In the case of Salman al-Rabie, a 22-year old Yemeni, who may or may not have attended al-Farouq in August 2001, the tribunal could not even decide whether they thought he had been captured in Tora Bora, or in Jalalabad, as he claimed. By the time of his second ARB in July 2006 (which he did not attend), the US authorities confidently placed him at al-Farouq and Tora Bora, and made clear that he was captured “coming out of the Tora Bora mountains” on December 16, 2001 “after surrendering to Afghan forces.” Whether he had any significant involvement with al-Qaeda, however, is less clear. Al-Rabie himself denied it, and the Americans’ claims centered not on al-Rabie, but on his brother, Fawaz, an alleged al-Qaeda operative, who “had some one-on-one meetings with Osama bin Laden,” and who, it was clear, had “constantly suggested” that Salman “travel to Afghanistan to receive training,” providing money for his travel and arranging for a contact to meet him on arrival in Karachi. For details of Yahya al-Rabie’s death in Yemen, and his father’s reiterations that Salman was not connected with al-Qaeda, click here.
Mohammed Laalami, a 25-year old Moroccan (transferred to Moroccan custody in February 2006), was also accused of training at al-Farouq, but said that this was something that he had admitted “when I was captured and being beaten and threatened with death.” He added, “I have spoken with a lawyer here and the Red Cross in Kandahar. I and others were being beaten and admitted to things that were not true.” According to his version of events, he went to Afghanistan for two months “as a pilgrimage” with his family, although he later admitted that he was captured alone, and was not asked to explain what had happened to his family. Refuting an allegation that he was captured by Northern Alliance soldiers in Tora Bora, he said, “I was captured in a small village in Jalalabad by Afghans. I did not have a weapon.”
Held in custody in Morocco after his transfer home, Laalami and two other former Guantánamo detainees were then put on trial, and accused of links with the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, which was suspected of involvement in the terrorist attacks in Casablanca which killed 45 people on May 16, 2003. In November 2006, he was convicted of setting up a “criminal gang,” being active in an unauthorized group and taking part in unauthorized gatherings. He was sentenced to five years in prison, but the sentence was quashed on appeal in May 2007, when he was, effectively, cleared of all the charges against him.
It’s also probable that Redouane Chekhouri, a 29-year old Moroccan, who was transferred to Moroccan custody in August 2004, was captured at this time, but I have been unable to discover any details of the circumstances of his arrest. Released on bail in November 2004, he was briefly rearrested a year later, in connection with an alleged terrorist cell that was accused of recruiting mujahideen to go to Iraq, but was released soon after, although two other former Guantánamo detainees arrested at the same time, Mohammed Mazouz and Brahim Benchekroun (see Chapter 12), are apparently still in Moroccan custody. Chekhouri’s brother, Younus (see Chapter 7) is still in Guantánamo, and is apparently regarded as a significant prisoner, even though he has eloquently maintained that he was opposed to the ideology of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
In addition, the stories of two other Saudis and an Afghan (all released) were unavailable at the time of writing. The transcripts for the CSRTs and the first round of the ARBs, on which the majority of my research for the book was based, along with some of the Unclassified Summaries of Evidence, were released by the Pentagon between March and May 2006, after the Associated Press, who had first filed requests under Freedom of Information legislation, took the government to court –- and won –- when the administration refused to cooperate. A second batch of documents, which included new documents relating to the second round of the ARBs, but which also included additional information about the CSRTs and the first round of the ARBs, was released after another FOIA request by the AP in September 2007, and it is from these documents that the stories of these men emerged, along with the stories of several dozen other detainees, which were, until that time, completely unknown.
31-year old Nasir al-Subii, who was released in February 2007, did not take part in any hearings at Guantánamo, and was accused, in his absence, of traveling to Afghanistan in response to a fatwa issued by Sheikh Hamoud al-Uqla. It was alleged that he “began to hear these callings” a month before 9/11, that he trained at al-Farouq for three weeks, and that, after the fall of Kabul, he traveled with other Arabs to Tora Bora, where he “received a weapon.” It was also alleged that he “lived in a small bunker dug out from the hills,” and that he was subsequently injured in the left leg, although he “was not sure if the injury was due to a bullet or shrapnel.” He was then “taken by an Afghani to a hospital in Jalalabad,” where, after five days, he (along with other prisoners described in the book, and, presumably, Omar al-Dayi, mentioned above) was “captured by the Northern Alliance and turned over to the Americans.”
Less information was offered in the case of 26-year old Khalid al-Muri, who was released in May 2006. In a one-page Summary of Evidence for his CSRT, in which it was stated that he was “a member of al-Qaeda,” it was alleged that he traveled to Afghanistan in August 2001, and “received military training at an al-Qaeda camp near Kabul” until September. It was also alleged that he “manned a fighting position in the Tora Bora mountain region from mid-November through mid-December 2001,” and that he surrendered to coalition forces near Jalalabad, which perhaps indicates that he fled from Tora Bora.
In the case of the Afghan –- 22-year old Mohamman Douad (released in September 2004) –- it was clear from the government’s own evidence that he was nothing but a Taliban conscript, one of many whose capture and transfer to Guantánamo was both pointless and cruel. After being “conscripted into the Taliban in June 2001,” he “was trained for 25 days” at a Taliban camp, “where he was taught how to fire the Kalashnikov, was given lessons from the Koran and performed servant duties.” He then “performed guard duties at a Taliban training camp,” “served as a cook for the Taliban,” and was captured by the Northern Alliance –- without any evidence that he had ever raised arms against anybody –- “while hiding in a Taliban vehicle attempting to cross into Pakistan.”
Although the stories of many of the men related in Chapter 4 of The Guantánamo Files, and in these additional accounts, indicate that a large number of pro-Taliban foreign fighters were rounded up at this time –- and that some may indeed have subscribed to Osama bin Laden’s global, anti-American jihad –- it seems clear from these unclassified accounts (into which almost every scrap of “evidence” was filed) that the “intelligence” extracted from them does not justify the wholesale flight from domestic and international law involved in imprisoning them without charge or trial in an offshore interrogation center for nearly six years. And the stories of others like Mohamman Douad, and, presumably, the other released Afghans mentioned in the notes (whose stories are mostly unknown), demonstrate a darker truth, which becomes even more apparent in some of the later chapters: that an array of innocent men and unwilling Afghan Taliban conscripts were also hurled, without any adequate screening whatsoever, into this gruesomely novel world of coercive interrogations and limitless detention.
Al-Dayi (ISN 549): CSRB Set 3, p. 138; ARB 2 Factors Set 7, pp. 27-8; al-Dhuby (ISN 506): ARB 2 Factors Set 6, pp. 88-90; al-Tayabi (ISN 332): CSRT Set 49, pp. 81-3; Set 50, pp. 1-11; Hadjarab (ISN 238): CSRT Set 33, pp. 69-71; Qasim (ISN 242): CSRT Set 53, 67-70; ARB Factors Set 1, 32-3; ARB 2 Factors Set 4, pp. 87-9; Kuman (ISN 321): ARB Factors Set 3, pp. 65-7; ARB 2 Factors Set 5, pp. 80-2; al-Otaibi (ISN 501): ARB Factors Set 1, pp. 86-7; ARB Factors Sep 07 Set 11, pp. 86-7; Haidel (ISN 498): CSRT Set 31, pp. 9-11; CSRB Set 3, pp. 104-5; al-Rabie (ISN 508): CSRT Set 53, pp. 40-2; ARB 2 Factors Set 6, pp. 94-5; Laalami (ISN 237): CSRT Set 33, pp. 72-4; Chekhouri (ISN 499); al-Subii (ISN 497): ARB 2 Factors Set 6, pp. 80-1; al-Muri (ISN 505): CSRT Factors Set 5, p. 80; Douad (ISN 527): CSRT Factors Set 5, pp. 50-1.
The stories of 12 others –- seven Afghans, four Pakistanis and the camp’s sole detainee from Turkmenistan, who were all probably captured at this time –- are largely unknown, because they were released in 2003 or 2004, before the tribunals began, and the Pentagon has not, to date, been obliged to provide any information relating to the detainees released in this period. The Afghans are: Sultan Mohammed (ISN 517), Khirullah Akah (ISN 518), Abdul Karim (ISN 520), Ataullah Adam Gul (ISN 525), who is possibly Lal Gul, a 19-year old, who said after his release in March 2004, “We don’t know what our crime was. They just arrested us and took us to Guantánamo prison,” Amanullah Alikozi (ISN 538), Noor Allah (ISN 539) and Wali Mohammed (ISN 547).
The Pakistanis are: Aminulla Amin (ISN 504), Bacha Khan (ISN 529), Mohammed Noman (ISN 541) and Mohammed Abas (ISN 542). The detainee from Turkmenistan is Emdash Abdullah Turkash (ISN 500), released in April 2004, who was 60 years old when he was captured.
This online chapter was published on November 27, 2007. On February 6, 2009, the story of Khalid al-Dhuby (ISN 506), a Yemeni, was added. In addition, the names of two Afghans and three Pakistanis, whose stories were listed as unknown, were removed. All were interviewed by McClatchy Newspapers for a major report on 66 released prisoners in 2008, and the stories of four of these men — Israr Ul Haq (ISN 515), Ehssanullah (ISN 523), Mohammed Omar (ISN 540) and Sajin Urayman (ISN 545) — were added to Website Extras 8. The story of Mohammed Sidiq, also known as Mahmud Sadik (ISN 512) was included in Website Extras 9.
Abbreviations used in the Notes (amended April 2012)
“CSRT” and “ARB” refer to the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which were held at Guantánamo from July 2004 to March 2005, and the first round of Administrative Review Boards, annual reviews held from December 2004 onwards. The transcripts of these hearings, released by the Pentagon in March and April 2006, can be found here. In addition to the transcripts of the CSRT and ARB hearings, this page also provides access to the Unclassified Summaries of Evidence for over a hundred ARB hearings.
“CSRB” refers to the Combatant Status Review Boards. These documents, which comprise the Unclassified Summaries of Evidence for 517 of the 558 CSRT hearings, were released by the Pentagon in 2005 under Freedom of Information legislation, although they are no longer online. For these transcripts, I have chosen a numbering system similar to that used for the CSRT and ARB hearings, so that, for example, “March 2005 Release” becomes “CSRB Set 3.”
“ARB 2” refers to the second round of Administrative Review Boards. The transcripts of these hearings, released by the Pentagon in September 2007 (after I completed The Guantánamo Files) can be found on the same Pentagon page as linked to above, under the heading “Administrative Review Board (ARB) Documents –- Round Two” and the sub-heading “Transcripts and Certain Documents from Administrative Review Boards (ARB) Round Two (held at Guantánamo in 2006).” Also included are the Unclassified Summaries for all the second round ARB hearings, under the sub-heading “Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for Administrative Review Boards (ARB) Round Two (held at Guantánamo),” which are referred to in the Notes as “ARB 2 Factors,” and below these are heavily redacted documents explaining decisions relating to the release or transfer of detainees. Also included are links to detailed and very useful indexes.
The documents released in September 2007 also augmented the information contained in previously released documents. This release has now been incorporated into the Pentagon page linked to above, but in the Notes above there are references to all the Unclassified Summaries from the CSRT process (with names and ISN numbers) — only 517 of which had been previously issued without names or numbers (see “CSRB” above) — which were included in this release of documents, and references to these documents are labeled as “CSRT Factors.” This release also included all the Unclassified Summaries from the first round ARBs, instead of the limited number released in 2006 (see “ARB Factors” above), and references to these documents in the Notes are labeled “ARB Factors Sep 07.” Also included are heavily redacted documents explaining decisions relating to the release or transfer of detainees.
“ISN” refers to “Internment Serial Numbers,” the unique number assigned to each prisoner in Guantánamo. A list of the 558 prisoners (identified by name, nationality and ISN) who went through the CSRT process can be found here. A list of 759 prisoners, including the 201 released or transferred before the CSRT process began (identified by name, nationality, date and place of birth and ISN), can be found here.
Some of the references in the Notes will not correspond to the files on the Pentagon’s current CSRT/ARB page, and if this is the case, then readers are directed to the New York Times‘ excellent project, The Guantánamo Docket, where all the CSRT and ARB documents can be searched for using the prisoners’ names or ISN numbers.
Andy Worthington is the author of The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (published by Pluto Press, distributed by Macmillan in the US, and available from Amazon — click on the following for the US and the UK) and of two other books: Stonehenge: Celebration and Subversion and The Battle of the Beanfield. To receive new articles in your inbox, please subscribe to my RSS feed (and I can also be found on Facebook, Twitter, Digg and YouTube). Also see my definitive Guantánamo prisoner list, updated in June 2011, “The Complete Guantánamo Files,” a 70-part, million-word series drawing on files released by WikiLeaks in April 2011, and details about the documentary film, “Outside the Law: Stories from Guantánamo” (co-directed by Polly Nash and Andy Worthington, and available on DVD here — or here for the US). Also see my definitive Guantánamo habeas list and the chronological list of all my articles, and please also consider joining the new “Close Guantánamo campaign,” and, if you appreciate my work, feel free to make a donation.
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